H2 – Regional Science Inquiry

G. Jason JOLLEY

Assistant Professor and MPA Director, Ohio University, Voinovich School of Leadership & Public Affairs

jolleyg1@ohio.edu

Anirudh V.S. RUHIL

Associate Professor, Ohio University, Voinovich School of Leadership & Public Affairs

ruhil@ohio.edu

Stephen KLEINSCHMIT

Assistant Professor, Western Michigan University, School of Public Affairs and Administration

stephen.kleinschmit@wmich.edu

Aleksey KOLPAKOV

Assistant Professor, University of Nevada, Reno, Political Science Department

akolpakov@unr.edu

Abstract

In an age of increased competition for economic growth, attracting destination retail is becoming an increasingly popular development strategy. Local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition to attract large-scale retail outlets, which may also serve as a lucrative source of local government sales tax revenue. This study uses a natural experiment design to examine sales tax revenue collections in a seven county region in the state of North Carolina in the United States focusing on the entrance of the Tanger Outlet Mall in Alamance County. After its opening, the county experienced several years of increased sales tax collections, particularly for apparel, relative to the surrounding region. Our evidence suggests that destination retail may prove a desirable strategy for promoting development, though we posit that structural changes in retail and apparel markets, as well as state tax policies, may work to undermine the utility of this approach as means of generating local tax revenue.

Keywords: Tanger, outlet malls, sales tax, LOST, destination retail

JEL classification: H73, H2, R5, R1, L81, Z38

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Kenichi SHIMAMOTO

Associate Professor, Hirao School of Management, Konan University

kenichi@center.konan-u.ac.jp

Abstract

The greenspace agreement is an effective method to promote the conservation and creation of greenspace. In this paper, the mechanism of the formation of the greenspace agreement is analysed using the coalition game. As a result, it was identified that the greenspace agreement requires a certain level of supporters in order to be formed and the most desirable situation is when there is a universal agreement. It also identified the possibility of the existence of free riders which could prevent a unanimous support of the greenspace agreement. The number of supporters of the greenspace agreement and number of free riders are dependent on the size of the external diseconomy caused by the lack of consideration for greenspace, the government’s enforceability of taxes on the diseconomy and the decline in land prices due to the external diseconomies from the neglect of greenspace. Furthermore, it was found that it was also influenced by the residents and stakeholder’s risk assessment based on their view towards the government’s enforceability of taxes and the rate of decline in land prices.

Keywords: Greenspace agreement, coalition game, free rider, external diseconomy

JEL classification: H2, Q5, R0