EOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST SYSTEM IN THE PRESENT JUNCTURE

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Abstract
This paper presents a systemic analysis of the Greater Middle East Geo-complex, in the light of the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement – both Shiite and Sunnite. We consider that the geostrategy practised by the Anglo-Saxon actors of the Super-system of this specific geo-complex aims at the containment strategy of the Russian and Chinese actors from the Mediterranean Sub-system, along with their ally states of Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and some of the UAE (e.g. Abu Dhabi). Furthermore, with the rise to power of the Sunnite Islamist governments in the region, a “remote” threat is tried to be exerted against both of the aforementioned actors in order to increase the negotiating benefits of the dipole of the London–Washington Special Relationship, in view of the provoked redrawing of the borders of the former nation-state regime.

Moreover, the US appear willing to create strong and permanent territorial strategic bases in the Middle East, in order to guarantee, both for Israel and the US, the strategic depth that is desirable for their security. We are making reference to the gradually developing strategic plan for the creation of an Independent Kurdistan, that would be able to serve western security interests, as well as the energy-related interests of the Anglo-Saxon, and European oil consortia, but also Washington’s power projection to the Russian Near Abroad and the Chinese Northwest region of Xinyang, increasing the power gap once again, in favour of the US, at the centre of the Rimland.

Keywords: Systems, Sub-systems, Super-system, Energy, Greater Middle East, Kurdistan, Qatar, Turkey, Abu Dhabi, Russia-China.
JEL Classification: R0

A. The Geopolitical Factor

The geopolitical factor of the present analysis is the Sunnite and Shiite Islamist movements as a power redistribution factor within the examined geo-complex that is analysed in the Systems described below:

The redistribution of power in question is examined within the Geographical Complex/System of the Greater Middle East, the Maghreb and the sub-Saharan Africa according to the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement.

B. Determination of Systemic Grades

I. The System: Greater Middle East, Maghreb, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

II. The Sub-systems:

1) The first subsystem: the Qatar - Saudi Arabia - Turkey triangle, as the operator of the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement
2) The second subsystem: Maghreb, Mali, Egypt
3) The third subsystem: Iran - Syria - Lebanon - Israel - Palestinian territories.
II. The Acting Super-system:

The US, the UK, Russia, France and China. The EU, as a whole, is clearly influenced by the London - Washington Special Relationship. The UN as a Super-systemic factor is functionally neutralised in the short-term, due to the existing policy diversions among the three Security Council members and the Russia-China Dipole.

C. Analysis of the Sub-systems

1. Analysis of the first (operating) sub-system (Qatar-Saudi Arabia and Turkey)

Qatar cooperates closely with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of Mohamed Morsi, as well as with Iran and Turkey. It does so, by competing the hegemonism of Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and by pursuing a powerful position among the Arab state factors in the Gulf and within the Arab-Muslim world, on the other. In fact, Qatar together with Iran exploit their common South Pars-North Field deposit (see Map 1) in the Arab-Persian Gulf. The geopolitical factor used by Doha to pursue these goals is the Islamist movement as represented by the Society of the Muslim Brothers by:

1) cooperating with Tehran in Bahrain and Yemen, where the Shiite element is dominant at a population level,
2) cooperating with Turkey, with the aim to overthrow the Syrian Baathist regime (competing Saudi Arabia on the same Syrian territory), and
3) cooperating with former and active members of Al Qaeda, operating even within the Turkish territory, close to the Syrian-Turkish borders, a territory that Qatar uses on an operational level in the battlefields and in subversive activities via guerilla wars or uprisings in the territory of the targeted states where Doha intervenes. In fact, Qatar intervenes in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt (in the case of the overthrow of Mubarak and currently in strengthening “Brother” Mohamed Morsi), Libya, Tunisia, Yemen (creating destabilising conditions for the Wahhabi regime of Riyadh which are critical for the West) and the financing of the Turkish “mediation” in the Syrian question. Qatar’s cooperation with (questionably) former members of Al Qaeda (such as Abdelhakim Belhadj, who also “worked” in Libya against the Ghaddafi regime), that have now been transferred on Qatar’s expenses (as Belhadj himself) to Turkish territory close to the Syrian borders, in order to organise the anti-Assad insurgency within Syria. These activities are extremely dangerous. Nevertheless, they are also followed by similar, equable yet presumably competitive, activities of Saudi Arabia, that is worried about Qatar’s power projection in the region, since Doha cooperates covertly with Tehran.

2. Analysis of the Second sub-system (Maghreb, Mali and Egypt)

The recent developments in Libya prove that the destructive interference of the Islamist movement is leading the country into a break-up. On March 6, 2012, Cyrenaica declared its

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1 “The estimations for the Iranian part of the deposit reach the 500 trillion cubic feet (14 trillion cubic meters) of the in place natural gas and around 360 trillion cubic feet (10 trillion cubic feet) of recoverable natural gas, that represents 36% of the proven Iranian deposits of natural gas and 5.6% of the proven global natural gas deposits [Iran-The Geology.- APS Review Gas Market Trends.- April 2, 2007]. The estimations regarding the deposits that belong to Qatar are 900 trillion cubic feet (25 trillion cubic meters) of recoverable gas, that represents around 99% of the proven deposits of Qatar and 14% of the proven global deposits. [Qatar Petroleum Annual Report 2005, p.25]. According to the Oil & Gas Journal, (January 1, 2011), Qatar has 25.4 barrels of proven reserves in oil and is the 16th larger exporter of crude oil globally (based on the 2009 data), while it is 11th in the list among the exporters of crude oil among the 12 members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) [Qatar Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal 1 of 10 file://Z:/NewCABs/V6/Qatar/Full.html]. The production of the North Field/Dome is estimated, based on the data of 2011, to approach the range of 23 billion cubic feet. [QatarGas, RasGas, Qatar Petroleum and Internet”], in: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Pars_/__North_Dome_Gas-Condensate_field>.

2 “Members of the main Turkish opposition party, the Republican People's Party, say Libyan and Saudi militants are freely entering Syria via Turkey's border. They also said that Turkish military escorts and protects the militants on their way to join terrorist groups in Syria. Analysts believe the move is part of an anti-Syria plot hatched by the US, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to fuel the unrest in the country by increasing the number of militants fighting against the government. “There are terrorists going through Turkey to get into Syria. They are all criminals and prisoners; Qatar and Saudi Arabia took all prisoners out of jails and sent them to Turkey to go to Syria to join terrorists there. There are 3,000 al-Qaeda members at the border, they fight in Syria and cause tension in Turkey and they are trying to ignite fire of war,” said Adnan Turkkan, political analyst and editor-in-chief of ULUSAL TV. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/12/25/288115/turkey-helps-militants-enter-syria/>.
autonomy, based on the opposition of its armed insurgents towards the Ghaddafi regime, as well as of the tribe leaders that live in its territory. Sheikh Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, cousin of King Idris who was expelled in 1969 by the Ghaddafi coup, was elected leader of the Cyrenaica region by a local transitional council, with responsibilities for the administration of the affairs of Cyrenaica and for the defence of the rights of its people. It is important to note that the National Transitional Council of Libya does not recognise this autonomy, while on the contrary the former is “recognised” by the autonomous administration of Cyrenaica\(^3\). Currently, there are numerous hardcore jihadist Islamist organisations that operate without control in Libya, under Qatar funding, e.g. the Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyen [Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (GICL/LIFG)], that was created in the early 1990s in Afghanistan. The official declaration of its foundation took place in 1995 and it constituted one of the root components of Al Qaeda, along with the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Yemeni Al Gehad, the Pakistani Al Hadith, the Lebanese Patriotic Movement/LLP, the Jordanian Beith al Emâm and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front/FIS. Islamists with a significant terrorist past, such as Anas al Liby (who was responsible for the attacks of August, 1998 on the American embassies in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania and Nairobi), and Abu Faradj al Libi, member of the Al Qaeda Military Council, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2005, are all members of this organisation\(^4\). Under these circumstances, nobody could prescribe a stable future for Libya, particularly since, under this developments and especially in the light of the uncontrolled armaments of of radical cells in Libya, an Islamist dominance is observed in all of the North Mali in collaboration with hardcore cells of Al Qaeda that are now acting freely in Sub-Saharan Africa, putting into danger the stability of Algeria, and probably, in the near future, of Mauritania and Morocco. In addition, the situation in Tunisia is not particularly stable and many analysts cast doubt on the sincerity and the “modesty” of the Islamic Al Nahda party now in power in Tunis.

3 See: <http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyr%C3%A9na%C3%AFque>.
3. Analysis of the Third Sub-system (Iran - Syria - Lebanon - Israel - Palestinian Territories)

As it might have become clear from the analysis above, Syria constitutes the key part of this sub-system. The collapse of the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah and the Tehran-Damascus-Hamas axes constitutes a strategic relief for the West for resolving the Palestinian issue on diplomatic terms, without external explosive influences. Also, such a scenario would greatly facilitate the appeasing of the explosive atmosphere in the Middle East and would prevent a significant amount of speculative actions by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the neo-Othoman Turkey.

Undoubtedly, we have to take into account the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, even under a slightly “Tukish-Kemalist” model. This development leads to second thoughts on the issue of Gaza, which was occupied by Israel in 1967. Since Hamas is currently a subsidiary organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, an upgrade of its relation with Cairo and a downgrading of Tehran's influence in Gaza is to be expected. The nature of this relationship (Hamas – Cairo), which is not yet clear, will greatly influence the resolution of the Palestinian issue with regard to the Two-(independent)-State solution: a Palestinian and an Israeli one. This plan seems to have now been placed on track, even if in an embryonic state yet, with resolution A/RES/67/19 of the UN General Assembly, in view of accepting the Palestinian entity with a non-member observer status.

It is obvious that the international community wanted to strengthen the moderate wing of the Palestinian Authority, that of President Mahmud Abbas, which was being led to isolation and de-legitimization by Hamas, especially after the international repercussion of the recent Israeli military reprisal operation “Pillar of Cloud” against Gaza (14/11-21/11/2012). My estimation is reinforced by the statement of Thomas Mayr-Harting, chief of the EU delegation at this specific Assembly. On the other hand, the “international community” certainly took also into account the fact that Hamas was seriously weakened after the strikes it suffered, even against some of its leading military officials (Ahmed al-Jabari was assassinated on 14/11/12 during the “Pillar of Cloud” operation), and that on a logistic level, its leadership (Ismail Haniya and Khaled Meshaal) had shown its intention to align with Mahmoud Abbas on the case of the recognition of the Palestinian entity as an observer state by the UN General Assembly. A study of the justification of the positive votes in the relevant Report on the UN resolution, convinces us that the decision was taken in the context of a dominant “two Peoples- two States” culture, living in peace with one another. It is, however, important to note that the consultations between Israel and Hamas for ceasefire and termination of the “Pillar of Cloud” Israeli operation took place with the mediation of Morsi's Egypt and not with that of Ankara, despite the latter's keen desire to intervene. As we have already mentioned, peace in the region will depend highly on the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

3.1. The Kurdish factor and the role of Abu Dhabi and Israel

The reaction of the Kurdish population in Syria remains a significant problem, since they do not wish the prevalence of the Muslim Brotherhood without a guarantee for their national, political and cultural freedoms. The Kurds constitute an ethnicity of 32 million people spread in four neighbouring states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria). Among them, only the Iraqi Kurds enjoy the above-mentioned freedoms. Furthermore, they have no trust in the Syrian revolutionary Council, due to the influence that the Muslim Brotherhood, with the aid of Qatar, has over it. The Kurds are constantly making moves towards their self-determination, as I write these lines. The destabilising forces are intense and systematic, also with the financial and logistic support of Abu Dhabi through an immense investment scheme in the

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Autonomous Kurdish Administration of N.Iraq. However, the relations of Abu Dhabi with the US, the UK and Israel are all well known. It is also well known, that Abu Dhabi, along with Saudi Arabia, are not positively disposed towards a possible hegemony of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which along with a possible prevalence in Egypt, Tunisia and Gaza Strip (through Hamas), would constitute the possible base for a Middle Eastern Caliphate, with Qatar as its logistic core and Morsi’s Egypt as its headquarters. Under the threat of such dynamics, the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement assumes a dissolving role, tending towards fragmentation of 1) the Alawite, Ismailite and Shiite Twelvers populations (around 2.2 to 2.5 million, i.e. 10-11% of the total population), on the one hand, and their concentration in areas close to coastal Syria; 2) the Kurdish population (around 2 to 3 million, i.e. 9 to 10% of the total population) and concentrations of Kurds towards the NE Syrian borders, adjacent to the Autonomous Kurdish Government; and 3) the Arab Sunnite population (around 60 to 70% of the total population, that is approximately 13.8 to 16 million), that will occupy the rest of the Syrian territory (See Map 2).

With regard to Israel and its relations with the Autonomous Kurdish Government (Herermi Kurdisani / Iraqi Kurdistan in the Kurdish language), we must highlight the fact that, since 1965, these relations have long been established and are and could be characterized as good or even excellent. In particular, “since the 2003 Iraq war, relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurds have continued to grow, as both sides see that mutual cooperation to serve their best needs.”

6  See: i) Tamsin Carlisle, «Oil strike in Iraq holds promise for Abu Dhabi», June 5, 2011, [http://www.thenational.ae/featured-content/channel-page/business/energy/oil-strike-in-iraq-holds-promise-for-abu-dhabi], ii) Isabel Coles, UPDATE 2 - "Abu Dhabi's TAQA in talks for Iraqi Kurdistan oil stake", Mon, Nov 12 2012 <http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKL5E88KC7G20121112> iii) “For Kurdistan, the strategy is clear. In part by getting its oil industry scaled up, it hopes “to carve out more autonomy,” says Joost Hiltermann, deputy Middle East director for the International Crisis Group. “That’s the minimum. Ideally they want to be independent. They make no bones about that.” (In an article in Foreign Affairs, Hiltermann argues that “the Kurds will remain stuck in Iraq, but more and more on their own terms.”) In line with that aim, the Kurds are reported to be in advanced talks with Abu Dhabi National Energy for a majority stake in a producing oilfield called Atrush.” see: <http://www.iraqbusinessnews.com/2012/04/09/abu-dhabi-buys-into-kurdish-power-plant> (Sources: Reuters, Bloomberg, The National). “KRG-controlled parts of Iraqi Kurdistan are estimated to contain around 45 billion barrels (7.2×10^9 m3) of oil, making it the sixth largest reserve in the world. Extraction of these reserves began in 2007. Iraq's former Baath regime controls the resources of Kirkuk and some parts of Mosul, cities claimed by the KRG to be included in its territory. As of July 2007, the KRG government solicited foreign companies to invest in 40 new oil sites, with the hope of increasing regional oil production over the following 5 years by a factor of five, to about 1 million barrels per day (160,000 m3/d). Gas and associated gas reserves are in excess of 100 TCF.” -<http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1259429>.}
national interest. It is important to note that Israelis have generally generated sympathy toward Iraqi Kurds, and historically there was hardly any enmity between the two sides. By and large, both Israel and the Kurds have at one point or another faced common hostility from Arab states. At present, the Israeli army has stepped up its military activities in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region. In August 2011, Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles were stationed in Iraq to operate against Iran (2). Barzani gave Israel the green light to deploy them in northern Iraq without gaining the approval of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, which has no diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv. Israeli intelligence agents and military advisers, equipped with special transmission devices, were reported to be sent to Mosul to train Kurdish security forces. President Barzani has reportedly agreed to the concession in return for the admission of a number of Iraqi Kurds to Israeli universities. On March 25, The Sunday Times published the article called Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear Hunt (3). As the story goes, Israel is using a permanent base in Iraqi Kurdistan to launch cross-border intelligence missions in an attempt to find “smoking gun” evidence that Iran is building a nuclear warhead. According to Western intelligence sources, the Israelis have been conducting such operations for several years. These risky intelligence missions have been intensified to an unprecedented degree in the past few months (4). The French press has also published related articles (5).

Such a redistribution of power will ignite the chain reaction of the Kurdish irredentism within Turkish territory as well. From that point on, Turkey will be obliged to cooperate closely, once again, with Iran, in order for them to jointly contain the Kurdish liberation dynamics, and to re-isolate itself from the West. However, if Iran proceeds to relevant provisions to the Kurdish element of its territories, giving prominence to its racial kinship with the Kurdish element since the Kurds form part of the Iranian ethnicity, it will manage to sustain no losses from this situation, leaving Turkey alone to counter the Kurdish separatist move, taking revenge at the same time for Ankara’s stance towards Syria up until now. Furthermore, we already observe and predict a strengthening in the relations of Baghdad and Tehran on a religious base (Shiite populations), to the disappointment of the Kurds living in N. Iraq and Syria. This fact strengthens the explosiveness of the Kurdish ethnic element in the region. Tehran aims to substitute strategically Syria with Iraq, in case the regime of Damascus falls.

Conclusively, the results of such a successful chain reaction that will lead to a number of cessations and ethogeneses will allow Washington to regain most part of its lost influence in the whole region of the Middle East and the Russian Near Abroad, especially now that the US are going to be confronting a constantly growing financial problem that is extremely difficult to address. Furthermore, it will offer Israel a safe territorial strategic depth, currently provided only by the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, with the Aegean and the Ionian Seas. We should not overlook the fact that, in the future, the Kurds could control the territories of the springs, half of the course of the Tiger and the Euphrates, as well as the oil reserves of Mosul and Kirkuk. In any case, the new emerging basis for the power balance that is being formed also favours Washington, London and Jerusalem.

D. Analysis of the Acting Super-system

a. Analysis of the Russian Power Pole of the Super-system

Russia has three very important reasons to not allow the deposing from power of the Assad regime and the Baath Party “without equivalent geostrategic returns”: 1. the deep waters port of Tartus, which Moscow has been using as a naval base for the Soviet Navy and the Fifth Soviet Navy Squadron, according to the 1971 Soviet-Syrian Agreement, that covered

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8 "Le Mossad utilise pour cela la région autonome du Kurdistan irakien, où ses agents ont renforcé leurs infiltrations.Les Israéliens, utilisent les opposants kurdos au régime iranien qui sont réfugiés dans les régions kurdes d'Irak» <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/01/09/001003-20120109ARTFIG00060-1-iran-defie-1-amerique.php>.

Moscow’s needs when its naval bases were withdrawn from Egypt in the late 1970s. Back then, Tartus became the 229th Support Naval Base of the Soviet Navy. During the mid-1980s, and up until 1991, Tartus was upgraded to the 720th Support Base of the Soviet Navy. Afterwards, Russia, successor of the USSR, erased 73% of Syria’s debt to Soviet Moscow (13.4 billion US dollars), and maintained, on the one hand, its rights in using the port of Tartus, preserving also its role as the main arms supplier of Assads’ Syria. Turkey’s violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention transformed the Dardanelles into a Turkish strait, one that since 1982 Ankara can open and close in its discretion, in times of war or peace. This means that, for Russia, the only strategic naval base in the Mediterranean is the port of Tartus. This became clear when lately (in the spring of 2012), the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetzov crossed the straits of Gibraltar and sailed into the port of Tartus with its submarine escort. Also, in July 2012, another group of Russian warships entered again the Tartus port. It is very important to consider President Putin’s visit to Israel (July 1, 2012) under the light of the subsequent loan of €5 bn which Moscow issued to Cypriot banks a few days later. If Moscow does not gain important benefits from the “West/NATO side” for the loss of the naval base of Tartus, probably acquiring a naval base in Cyprus, it will not leave Assad and his government helpless in Damascus. 2. The second great interest of Putin’s Moscow in Syria is that of the Russian arms trade to Damascus. Both these strategic Russian interests will be dealt with a lethal blow if the Baath regime in Damascus is replaced by another one, and especially if it is a Muslim Brotherhood one. 3. The third issue that will arise for Moscow is the proximity of a Sunni Islamist movement with the area of its Muslim cultural basis in the Near Abroad, i.e. the in central Asia. Moreover, such a proximity would lead to a possible destabilisation of Iran, due to the Kurdish explosion caused by the probability (or the fact) possibility of an Islamic Syrian government. Iran is not a threat to Russia - quite the contrary. However, its destabilization could cause an expansion of the Sunni Islamic movement in Central Asia.

b. Analysis of the Chinese Power Pole of the Super-system

Iran is China's principal oil and gas supplier. It is also an important area for investment by Beijing in the energy sector. Lately, for example, Sinopec, the largest and most important Chinese petrochemical company, signed with Tehran (on December 9, 2011) a USD 2 bn. net worth contract, for the exploitation of the Iranian field of Yadavaran, on the SE of the country. This field could produce around 85.000 barrels of crude oil per day (b/d) during its first four-year exploitation period, and around 100.000 b/d during the following three years. According to the contract clauses, Beijing is obliged to purchase USD 100 bn - worth oil and LNG from Tehran, during the following 25 years. There are, however, reasons of geostrategic security, similar to those concerning Moscow, that oblige Beijing to support the Shiite cleric regime of Tehran against the Sunnite radical movement, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported by Qatar and Turkey with the tolerance of the US and the UK. Namely, the separatist Muslim movement of the Uyghurs in the NW Chinese region of Xinjiang, bordering with Kazakhstan, where the construction of a pipeline is planned, terminating in Shanghai, to supply China with gas. Turkey supports this movement in every possible manner, so that in case the region of Xinjiang decides to break away from China, the supply with natural gas from Russia and Kazakhstan to China would no more be possible, due to the territorial interference of an independent Xinjiang. Furthermore, we should not forget that the region of Xinjiang is very rich in minerals (122 minerals in total, of which 70 are non metallic), and in water resources (yearly flow of 88.5 billion cubic meters of surface waters and 25.3 billion cubic meters of exploitable sub-surface water resources). Water resources originating from glaciers have been calculated to 2.581 billion cubic meters. Furthermore, the estimated anthracite deposits

constitute more than 38% of the total country’s deposits, while the estimated oil and natural gas deposits are 30 billion tons, that is more than 25% of the country’s total. A change of regime in Iran could radically change the balance of power in the wider region, placing significant pressure on China through the promotion of the Sunnite Islamist movement in the region of Xinyiang, which is rich in resources and strategically important for the energy connection between Russia and China. During the 2000 census, the Uyghur population was 8,399,393 million.

C. Analysis of the Pole of the “Special Relation” of the Super-system

The already analysed activity of the first sub-system, has as its allies an economically weak Washington and the Obama administration in a pre-election period, thus not being in position to present itself as belligerent, while the whole of the “Special Relation” desires to contain the expansion of the Russian influence in the Mediterranean, and particularly the South-eastern Mediterranean, which abounds in vast deposits of natural gas, in the Levant and the Herodotus (SE of Crete) Basins, and are estimated to surpass 6 trillion cubic meters.

Therefore, it is an Anglo-Saxon containment policy that the US, Germany, and the UK used during the 1990s also in the Balkans, aiming once more to contain Russia’s descent to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, such policy decisions are erroneous and irreversible, particularly when Washington, attempting to affiliate with the radical Islamist elements of the region, and following the dogma that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, does not hesitate to assign to the American information services to arm these radical Islamic terrorist cells to overthrow, for example, Assad’s regime in Syria, without taking into account that afterwards, it will be unable to control the Islamist government that may come to power in Damascus, or the possible fragmentation of Syria into three separate entities (Kurdish, Alawi-Shia and Sunnite). Unless, of course, this is well within Washington’s aims, and Ankara does not have the slightest idea!

A conclusive question

Therefore, we ought to put forward the following, evident question: is that, that once again, this Anglo-Saxon policy, inspired by the late period of the theories of Nicolas J. Spykman – and through the ‘kind services’ of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey- is actually leading to the creation of a most powerful Golem that will unleash Armageddon in the Mediterranean and will lead to an explosive and violent redrawing of borders in the Middle East and Maghreb? Unless, of course, this is the result that is actually… intended! And that the concern is to contain the Russian and Chinese interests away from the Mediterranean, especially now that the global economic crisis does not allow to the “Special Relationship” the luxury to maintain in power “pro-Western” totalitarian regimes in the region.

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13 As Barry Rubin mentions: “Of course, a large part of the problem with Obama’s policy is that he not only treated enemies as friends and did not pressure supposed friends that acted like enemies, he joined them. Thus, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are arming anti-American Islamist forces in Syria with U.S. intelligence officers supervising the weapons’ supplying. The only restriction is that the guns don’t go to groups affiliated with al-Qaida. Otherwise, it doesn’t matter how extremist they are. In Libya, one of the groups—treated as “good guys”—supplied with guns by the United States during the civil war there went on to kill the U.S. ambassador” <http://www.gloria-center.org/2012/12/a-paradox-of-u-us-middle-east-policy-the-friend-who-acts-like-an-enemy-is-an-enemy/> (accessed January 2, 2013).
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